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CASE COMMENTS
fact that counsel in the Rose case brought out the possibility of
conflicting interests before the case went to trial. This action was in
accord with the American Bar Association Canons of Professional
Ethics, Canon No. 6 (1957), which says it is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Under this canon a
lawyer "represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose." Unlike the Rose case, counsel for the
defense in the principal case was not faced by such a conflict
merely because the codefendants entered unlike pleas, nor did such
a conflict arise during the trial. The decision reached by the supreme
court in the principal case is obviously a sound one.
T. E. P.

CnvaiAL LAw-CONFnEMEN

IN T

PmrrmTImy WrrlouT

INDI-mrr-EscAPE FRoM ILLEGAL CusToD.-Relator, a 16 year
old youth, was adjudged a delinquent and sentenced to the West
Virginia industrial school for boys by the juvenile court of Ohio
County. Conviction was for the theft of an automobile and was
based on a plea of guilty and testimony of the arresting officer.
Relator was later certified as an incorrigible and was returned from
the school to the juvenile court which thereupon sentenced him
to the West Virginia penitentiary and issued commitment thereon.
While serving his sentence in the penitentiary, relator escaped and,
upon recapture, was indicted and sentenced to an additional fifteen
months for the escape. On a writ of habeas corpus, the court held
that the relator had been sentenced and committed to the penitentiary without an indictment in violation of W. VA. CoNsT. art. III,
§ 4, and that he could not, therefore, be guilty of an escape. The
prisoner was ordered discharged. State ex rel. McGilton v. Adams,
102 S.E.2d 145 (W. Va. 1958).
There are at least two distinct problems presented by this
case. The first, which involves the pertinent statute that permits
juveniles to be imprisoned in the penitentiary, can be disposed of
quickly. W. VA. CoDE c. 28, art. 1, § 7 (Michie 1955), allows an
incorrigible in the West Virginia industrial school for boys to be
"returned to the court by which he was committed to the school,
and such court shall thereupon pass such sentence upon him
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as to confinement in the penitentiary as may be proper in the
premises, or as it might have passed had it not committed him to
the industrial school." W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 4, provides that
"no person shall be held to answer for treason, felony or other crime,
not cognizable by a justice, unless on presentment or indictment
of a grand jury." W. VA. CODE c. 62, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1955),
provides that "the trial of a person on a charge of felony shall always
be by indictment." Such an indictment is a condition precedent to a
conviction of a felony. State v. McGraw, 140 W. Va. 547, 85 S.E.2d
849 (1955). On its face, W. VA. CODE c. 28, art. 1, § 7 (Michie
1955), seems to offer a proper and expeditious course, but surely
the legislature could not have intended the statute to be operative
in a manner depriving the accused of basic constitutional rights.
The second problem, perhaps more thought provoking, involves
the question of whether a prisoner in custody who effects an escape,
is guilty of the escape or any other crime committed while so escaping or attempting to do so. In the principal case, the prisoner was
in the unique position of being in the penitentiary without any
indictment at all against him, and therefore, the court held, he had
the right to escape from this illegal detention. Only one other West
Virginia case dealt with an escape from illegal custody. The case
of State v. Pishner, 72 W. Va. 603, 78 S.E. 752 (1918), was mentioned in the instant case, but the court here refused to approve,
disapprove, or comment thereon. In the Pishnercase, the defendant
escaped pending action on a writ of error to a judgment of conviction for a felony, which judgment was subsequently reversed. In
a 3 to 2 decision, the defendant was held to be not guilty of an
escape. Judge Browning in the principal case, at page 148, noted:
"It is sufficient to say that there is a vast difference between a void
sentence, which may be reached by habeas corpus, and a sentence
under a valid indictment, improper because of reversible error
committed by the trial court, which is cognizable in this Court only
upon a writ of error."
In other jurisdictions, the cases do not seem to go as far as
the Pishner case, though there are a few which have held a conviction for escape to be erroneous due to the gravity of the error
of the original confinement.
In People v. Ganger, 97 Cal. App. 2d 11, 217 P.2d 41 (1950), an
information against the defendant was not filed within the specified
time period, nevertheless the defendant was guilty of an escape. In
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People v. Hinze, 97 Cal. App. 2d 1, 217 P.2d 85 (1950), there was
an irregularity in the sentence making the conviction voidable, but
the defendant was guilty of an escape. A similar ruling was handed
down in People v. Darnell, 107 Cal. App. 2d 541, 287 P.2d 525
(1951). Bayless v. United States, 141 F.2d 578 (1944), held that
a sentence which was irregular or voidable was not a defense to a
charge of escape, and the court said, at page 579, "a difference of
opinion might cause a death." State v. Palmer,45 Del. 308, 72 A.2d
442 (1950), held that a commitment, void on its face, is justification
for an escape, but where there is a mere informality or irregularity
in the process of commitment, arrest, or information, a defense of
justification for escape is not sufficient. Again in Commonwealth
ex rel. Penland v. Ashe, 142 Pa. Super. 403, 17 A.2d 244 (1941),
where the indictment did not substantially comply with the statute,
the defendant was guilty of an escape.
Similar to the Pishner case, are Moore v. Commonwealth, 801
Ky. 851, 193 S.W.2d 448 (1946); and Jones v. State, 158 Miss. 366,
180 So. 506 (1930), where the escapes were made pending appeals
to convictions which were subsequently reversed. In the Moore
case, the court cited the Pishnercase, but refused to follow it, stating
that the Pishner case was the minority rule.
A conviction and confinement by a mayor's court without a
jury for an assault and battery constituted illegal custody under a
statute requiring legal custody as a prerequisite for the offense of
escape. State v. Ferguson, 100 Ohio App. 111, 135 N.E.2d 884
(1955). People v. Ah Teung, 92 Cal. 421, 28 Pac. 577 (1891), a
leading case, held that the offense of escape requires legal custody,
and where the defendant is held without even the color of authority,
a conviction for an escape cannot be sustained. Accord, Housh v.
People, 75 IU. 487 (1874); State v. Beebe, 13 Kan. 437 (1874). In
such a case, the escapee may use such force as is necessary to secure
his liberty. State v. Leach, 7 Conn. 452 (1829).
Though there are some jurisdictions today which would not
permit an escapee to justify his flight by claiming illegal custody,
the majority distinguish between the cases where the original conviction was void or merely voidable. An escape under a void conviction would provide a defense to the offense of escape, whereas the
escapee under a voidable conviction would have no such defense.
The advisability of ever permitting an escapee to use his illegal
confinement as a defense is seriously questioned. Although legal
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means of gaining release from confinement are not always adequate,
when balanced against possible consequences of permitting the
illegal custody to be used as a defense to the escape, there is no
question as to which is the better course. A prisoner, knowing he
may have such a defense if he escapes and is recaptured, might
be prone to try the escape first, and then, if recaptured, seek his
legal remedy. Assume a prisoner following such a course attempts
an escape and is halted by an armed guard. In his anxiety, he slays
the guard. Could he then claim he was illegally confined and had
every right to use all the force necessary in attempting to gain his
liberty? If such is the case, any force which he uses up to and
including homicide becomes an act of self-defense. In Meirs v.
State, 84 Tex. Crim. 161, 29 S.W. 1074 (1895), the defendant, in
seeking freedom, shot and killed a deputy sheriff who was attempting to tale the defendant into custody without a capias. The Texas
court there held it was self-defense. Would the West Virginia court
so hold today?

I. A. P., Jr.

CmnNAL LAw-RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TBIAL--CoURTRoom BumnM

Purnimc.-The defendant sought to waive her right to a public
trial during a murder prosecution so that she could testify in her
own behalf concerning certain abnormal sexual practices. The
trial court granted the motion and the public was excluded in order
to prevent emotional disturbance to the defendant. The defendant
was found guilty and the petitioners, certain members of the public,
sought a ruling on the exclusion order. Held, that it was within
the discretion of the court to exclude the public during the time the
defendant was on the stand, but, in the light of a statutory provision providing for open court, the trial judge's order was too broad.
The exclusion should have been limited to the time during which
the defendant testified. Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App.
2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956).

TO

In this decision the court was faced with the task of balancing
two principles, the extent of the constitutional guarantee to a public
trial and the interest of the public to see that justice is done. A
better understanding of this problem may be had by briefly examining the treatment given these principles in other courts.
In federal law the Constitution guarantees that, "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
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